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DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING AND THE INTERNET: 
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AUDIEY C. KAO* AND ERICA OZANNE LINDEN** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the Internet as a social and economic force in shaping 
the interactions of individuals and institutions in modern society is 
unprecedented.  The reality and future of this technology to link participants at 
any place, any time and for a countless number of ends provides buyers and 
sellers, creators and thinkers, citizens and polity with the power to transact, 
innovate and connect with increasing efficiency and effectiveness.  In the 
realm of health and health care, the Internet provides patients, physicians and 
others in the health care delivery system with the potential to provide medical 
care more cost-effectively, improve the quality of care that is delivered and 
broaden access to necessary health information and services. 
One aspect of the Internet’s impact on medicine is the rapid proliferation 
of health-related information, valid and invalid, to patients and the public.  
Thousands of health websites, patient support listserves and health-related 
advertisement banners are readily accessible by Internet users and offer a new 
medium for third parties to engage in conventional activities in very different 
ways.  One such activity is direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising. 
In DTC advertising, health-related manufacturers and companies offer 
product-related information to the public with the expectation of increasing 
demand for their products.  Until recently, DTC advertisers exclusively 
disseminated product-related information to a mass audience through print and 
television.  The rise of the Internet, however, has ushered in an entirely new 
dynamic whereby third parties can deliver customized information to 
individual patients.  Proponents of DTC advertising argue that product-related 
information empowers consumers to take more control of their personal health 
and health care, further bolstering patient autonomy. 
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While the Internet offers many benefits, there are significant risks that 
accompany this technology, and the growth of DTC advertising on the Internet 
is not immune to such hazards.  Privacy advocates are concerned about 
unauthorized access by third parties to individually identifiable health 
information.  With delivery of more customized information, DTC advertising 
begins to take on features that could be better described as direct-to-patient 
advising, and as such, new product liabilities may arise.  But beyond any new 
legal liabilities, pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers and 
other health-related companies have responsibilities as corporate citizens, 
especially as patients and the public rely more on the health information that 
they provide.  Therefore in this Article, some key emerging ethical, legal and 
societal concerns presented by DTC advertising on the Internet are examined 
including: (1) informational privacy, (2) product liability and (3) 
organizational responsibility. 
II.  DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING AND THE FDA 
In recent years, there has burst upon the scene a brand new way of 
reaching consumers with information about new drugs and other health 
products.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which has regulatory 
jurisdiction over advertisement for prescription drugs, permitted product-
specific television advertising for the first time in August 1997.1  In the year 
prior to this FDA decision, annual spending on DTC advertising was $600 
million.2  By 1999, expenditures exceeded $1.5 billion with trends for 
advertising spending, primarily on television, expected to continue for the 
foreseeable future.3 
FDA regulations on advertising are based on the premise that the 
advertisement is truthful, presenting a fair balance of risks and effectiveness to 
the consumer.  As such, product-specific advertisements were required to 
include information in “brief summary” relating to the product’s side effects, 
contraindications and effectiveness.4  In the print ad form, advertisers could 
 
 1. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 established the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).  The FDA was given authority over the 
labeling of pharmaceuticals, both prescription and over-the-counter medication.  However, 
control over drug advertising remained with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  In 1962, the 
Kefauver-Harris amendments to the original 1938 Act transferred authority for prescription drug 
advertisement from the FTC to the FDA. 
 2. Jeffrey T. Berger et al., Direct-to-Consumer Drug Marketing: Public Service or 
Disservice?,  68 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 197, 197 (2001). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Drug advertisements generally fall into three categories.  Health-seeking advertisements 
educate consumers about a disease or medical condition without a specific mention of a drug.  
However, this form of advertisement is prohibited if the associated product is the only treatment 
available for the disease or medical condition.  Reminder advertisements provide the name of the 
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readily comply with this requirement for a brief summary.  With expansion 
into television advertising, providing information about a product’s safety and 
efficacy—even in a brief summary—was limited by the substantial time 
constraints placed on this newly available communication medium. 
Recognizing the difficulty of communicating the information required in 
the brief summary effectively in a television ad of reasonable length, the 
revised FDA regulations tried to balance the advertisers’ need for flexibility 
with the regulators’ obligation to protect the consumer.  The draft FDA 
guidelines first issued in 1997 and finalized in August 1999,5 established 
several requirements for third parties such as pharmaceutical companies who 
want to market their products via television. 
Advertisers who wish to market prescription drugs on television, for 
example, are required to present the drug’s major risk factors as part of a 
“major statement” in either the audio or audio and visual parts of the television 
ad.6  In addition, they must provide “adequate provision” for the dissemination 
of the approved labeling to satisfy requirements set out by the brief summary 
standard.7  The guidelines outline an acceptable approach to fulfilling these 
requirements, which includes the following components:8 
 
 Disclosure of an operating toll-free phone number to call for approved 
package labeling in which customers are given the option of having the 
labeling mailed to them or read over the phone. 
 
 Disclosure in the ad of an Internet web address for package labeling. 
 
 Reference to mechanisms to provide package labeling to consumers 
with restricted access to technology, such as the Internet, by (a) 
providing additional product information in print ad form in 
publications that reach the broadcast audience, or (b) ensuring the 
availability of a sufficient amount of brochures containing package 
 
drug and other minimal information, but say nothing about the drug’s use, effectiveness or safety.  
Product-specific advertisements, which represent the vast majority of prescription drug 
advertisements, mention a drug therapy by name, describe its therapeutic use(s), and make 
representations about its safety and effectiveness.  The FDA regulations that require advertisers to 
provide extensive product information such as through a brief summary apply only to product-
specific advertisements. 
 5. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services et al., Guidance for Industry: 
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
cder/guidance/index.htm. 
 6. Id. at 1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 2. 
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labeling in publicly accessible sites (for instance, pharmacies, doctor’s 
offices and grocery stores). 
 
 Disclosure in the ad that healthcare providers may offer additional 
information to consumers.9 
 
Despite the public’s expectation to the contrary, the FDA does not require 
product-specific television advertisements to be pre-screened for regulatory 
compliance. 10  Advertisements may be voluntarily submitted for pre-clearance 
before broadcast, and the FDA will then deem it appropriate or send the 
marketing campaign back for revision and editing.  In summary, the FDA 
regulations outlined above are based on these assumptions: the advertisements 
are not false or misleading; there is a fair balance between the product’s 
benefits and risks; and all information relating to important risks and approved 
uses and limitations are in consumer-friendly language. 
III.  THE POWER OF THE INTERNET: FROM DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER 
ADVERTISING TO DIRECT-TO-PATIENT ADVISING 
As many of us have experienced, one benefit of the Internet is its ability to 
deliver relevant information to a specific user at anytime, about almost 
anything and seemingly anywhere.  The power to deliver individually relevant 
information is based largely on the Internet’s ability to identify the specific 
person who is online.  An example of this technological ability is exemplified 
by Amazon.com, the world’s largest Internet consumer commerce site.  
Whenever I visit Amazon.com, the following message always appears: “Hello, 
Audiey Kao, we have recommendations for you.”  First, Amazon.com is able 
to identify the user based on information that has been voluntarily provided to 
them.  Second, a review of previous purchases allows Amazon.com to 
recommend products such as CDs or books that may be of interest.  Lastly, 
Amazon.com has agreed not to share the kind of information noted above with 
third parties without explicit consent of the user. 
Amazon.com’s ability to create a personal experience for their consumers 
is attainable by almost all entities doing business on the Internet, including 
those engaged in DTC advertising.  For example, a pharmaceutical company 
 
 9. Id. at 3. 
 10. According to a study by Robert Bell, Richard Kravitz and Michael Wilkes, a large 
number of consumers incorrectly believe that DTC ads carry the imprimatur of the federal 
government.  Based on a survey of consumers, half of all respondents believed that DTC ads had 
to be submitted to the government for prior approval, 43% believed that only “completely safe” 
drugs could be advertised directly to consumers, 22% thought that advertising of drugs with 
serious side effects had been banned and 21% believed that only “extremely effective” drugs 
could be marketed directly to consumers.  Robert A. Bell et al., Direct-to-Consumer Prescription 
Drug Advertising and the Public, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 651, 654-55 (1999). 
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has the same capability of user identification based on information provided by 
a patient.  A review of individually identifiable health information permits a 
pharmaceutical company to better target its products to a patient’s medical 
problems. With these capabilities, web-based advertisement banners purchased 
by a pharmaceutical company could read as follows: “Hello, Audiey Kao, we 
have recommendations for treating your gout.” 
In this case, a pharmaceutical company is acting less like a traditional 
advertiser, but more like an adviser who recommends certain treatments that 
may be of benefit to the patient.  Research on the impact of DTC advertising 
on consumer behavior reveals that many patients, especially those diagnosed 
with a condition for which a given drug was advertised, are likely to ask their 
physician to prescribe the advertised medication by name.11 As DTC 
advertising becomes more customized to the individual health circumstances of 
the patient, the effect on consumer behavior as it relates to the demand for such 
advertised products is likely to increase.  Therefore, given the power offered 
by the Internet to pharmaceutical companies and others, a shift from DTC 
advertising to direct-to-patient advising may have a significant impact on both 
the cost and quality of medical care. 
This conceivable transformation from direct-to-consumer advertising to 
direct-to-patient advising depends on a company’s access to individually 
identifiable health information, especially detailed health information held by 
entities such as pharmacies and health plans.  Concerns about protecting the 
privacy of individually identifiable health information will be addressed in the 
next section.  For the remainder of this section, we briefly review the variety of 
ways that third parties can obtain individually identifiable health information 
without consent, and how this information can be used by third parties such as 
pharmaceutical companies to identify patients and provide them with product-
specific information that may affect their medical decision-making and 
behavior. 
Like other personal information, individually identifiable health 
information can be obtained by third parties without the knowledge or consent 
of the concerned individual.  Entities ranging from pharmacies and life 
insurance companies to health plans and hospitals collect information about an 
individual’s health conditions and status as part of their routine business 
practices.  Data brokers or information clearinghouses can purchase some of 
this information for various purposes, including product marketing. 
 
 11. Prevention & American Pharmaceutical Association, Navigating the Medication 
Marketplace: How Consumers Choose (1997), available at http://www.aphanet.org/lead/ 
execsumm.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2001).  In this survey, more than one-third of respondents 
reported asking their doctors for information about a drug they had seen or heard advertised, and 
nearly a quarter asked for the drug itself.  Of those, three-quarters reported that their doctors 
provided the requested prescription. 
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A number of examples demonstrate how third parties gain access to 
personal health information without consent.  One example centers on 
participation in informal health screenings.12  Free or low-cost screenings are 
often offered to the public to test blood pressure, cholesterol levels, physical 
fitness and weight.13  These screenings usually occur in non-health care 
settings such as pharmacies, shopping centers or the workplace.14  The data 
collected has the potential to end up in the data banks of third parties.  These 
third parties are often pharmaceutical manufacturers or medical device 
companies that have products to sell related to the test.15  Another example 
involves practices by companies such as Medical Marketing Service, which 
advertised a database to pharmaceutical marketers that includes the names of 
several million people with allergies, bladder control problems and 
depression.16  In another example, the pharmaceutical benefits manager, 
RxAmerica used patient data to solicit business for its owner, American Drug 
Stores.17  Patients were asked to switch drug stores and patronize a drug store 
chain owned by American Drug Stores.18  One final example concerns the 
pharmacy chain, CVS.  A class-action lawsuit was filed against the drug store 
alleging that CVS gave patient prescription records to a marketing firm to send 
letters to customers and that the funds for the mailing were provided by 
pharmaceutical companies.19 
In addition to health-related entities selling individually identifiable health 
information, companies have now learned how to collect health information 
from individuals who use the Internet.  One way of collecting health 
information via the Internet is through the keywords individuals use when 
visiting search engine sites.20  For example, DoubleClick, an Internet ad 
company, allows advertisers to “purchase” keywords.21  This enables 
 
 12. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 8: How Private Is My Medical Information? 
(2001), at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs8-med.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Health Privacy Project, Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown 
University, Medical Privacy Stories, at http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr_doc/ 
mprivacystories%2Epdf (last modified July 21, 2001). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. State’s Highest Court Allows Class Action Suit Against CVS, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWSWIRES, May 2, 2001; See Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 522, 526 (Mass. 
2001). 
 20. On Internet Privacy and Profiling Before the Senate Commerce Committee (June 13, 
2000) (statement of Richard M. Smith, Internet Consultant from Brookline, Massachusetts), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/hearings/0613smi.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2001) 
[hereinafter Smith statement]. 
 21. Id. 
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companies to monitor topics of interest to web users.  When a company owns a 
specific keyword like “depression,” that company’s banner ads will appear on 
the search results page when that phrase or word is used.22 
Internet ad companies also collect personal information from Internet users 
via a system termed online profiling through which they build individualized 
profiles of people.23  A profile rates a person on his or her level of interest in 
certain areas, allowing companies to target users with specific ads and 
information.24  A profile is automatically created when a user is shown a 
banner ad from an Internet ad network.25  The user is assigned a customer 
identification (ID) number that is stored with the profile.26  This ID number, 
called a “cookie” is sent back to the user’s computer.27  By synchronizing 
cookies, Web sites can provide Internet ad companies with personal data about 
users.28  This means that once a single company knows an Internet user’s 
identity, any of the other companies in the advertising network can identify the 
user when the user visits their sites.29 
Internet ad companies also track users with “Web Bugs.”30  Web Bugs are 
invisible images on Web pages that send back cookies to Internet ad company 
servers and track the pages that Internet users access.31  Web Bugs are used to 
“see who has come to a Web site after viewing a banner ad, to transfer both 
personal and non-personal information from a Web site to an Internet ad 
company, to provide data to an online profile, [and] to count ad impression and 
page hits.”32 
IV.  INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 
DTC advertising raises concerns about the privacy of personal health 
information.  For third parties such as pharmaceutical companies to better 
target advertising directly to patients, they must have some level of personal 
health information about the patients.  As noted above, this information can be 
obtained in a variety of ways, ranging from information given voluntarily by 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Smith statement, supra note 20. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. The term “cookie” is a computer science term used to describe pieces of data held by 
an intermediary.  David Whalen, Cookie Central, The Unofficial Cookie FAQ, at 
http://www.cookiecentral.com/faq/ (last modified May 10, 1999). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Cookies Page, at http:www.epic.org/ 
privacy/internet/cookies/default.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2001). 
 30. Smith statement, supra note 20. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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individuals to patient lists or medical records purchased from health care 
organizations.  While there are potential benefits to DTC advertising, accessing 
and using one’s individually identifiable information without his or her consent 
is a violation of privacy that can have broad and detrimental consequences—
from securing health insurance coverage to employment discrimination. 
In 1996, Congress began to address the issue of the privacy of individually 
identifiable health information by enacting the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).33  The law included provisions that facilitated 
electronic transactions of individually identifiable health information.34  In 
addition, it established new regulations to protect the security and 
confidentiality of such information.  The Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) promulgated the requisite standards, entitled Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (the Privacy Rule), 
which came into effect on April 14, 2001.35  Most health plans and health care 
providers covered by the rule must comply with the new standards by April 14, 
2003.36 
Information that is protected under the Privacy Rule includes all 
individually identifiable health information used or disclosed by an entity 
covered under the regulations.37  The form the disclosure takes, whether 
electronic, oral or on paper, is irrelevant.38  Entities covered by the rule 
(“covered entities”) are health plans, health care providers and health care 
clearinghouses.39  While not directly covered, included in the regulations are 
standards relevant to the use of protected health information (PHI) by third 
parties.  These standards restrict the information that health care plans and 
providers can give or sell—to pharmaceutical companies, for example—thus 
reducing the pool of information available to companies for use in marketing 
and DTC advertising. 
The Privacy Rule specifically addresses the use and disclosure of PHI for 
marketing purposes.40  The rule defines marketing, sets limits on the kind of 
marketing that can be done and requires authorization for all other uses or 
disclosures of PHI for marketing purposes.41  Marketing is defined as making 
 
 33. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 66 Fed. Reg. 
12,434, 12,434 (Feb. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 and 164). 
 36. Id. 
 37. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001). 
 38. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Fact Sheet, Protecting the 
Privacy of Patients’ Health Information (July 6, 2001), at  http://hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/ 
01fsprivacy.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2001) [hereinafter HHS Fact Sheet]. 
 39. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. 
 40. See §§ 164.501, 164.514(e). 
 41. § 164.501; HHS Fact Sheet, supra note 38. 
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“a communication about a product or service a purpose of which is to 
encourage recipients of the communication to purchase or use the product or 
service.”42  The Rule excludes certain activities from the definition of 
marketing, including describing participating plans or providers in a network 
and describing the services and benefits covered by a health plan.43 
The Privacy Rule places very stringent requirements on the use of PHI by 
covered entities for marketing purposes.  In general, covered entities must 
obtain specific authorization to use or disclose PHI in a marketing 
communication.44  There are, however, certain activities that are exempt from 
the authorization requirements.  These include face-to-face communications 
with an individual and communications in which the products involved are of 
nominal value.45  Covered entities are also exempted from the requirements if 
the communication identifies the entity, states whether the entity is being 
compensated for making the communication and explains to individuals how 
to opt out of further communications.46 
While the Privacy Rule pertains only to covered entities and not to third 
parties, such as medical device companies and pharmaceutical companies, the 
standards for marketing indirectly apply to such companies.  Covered entities 
are allowed to disclose PHI for marketing purposes only to a “business 
associate that assists the covered entity with such communications.”47  For a 
third party to qualify as a business associate, the covered entity and the third 
party must enter into a contractual agreement which stipulates that the PHI can 
only be used for the entity’s own marketing activities.48  Entities are permitted 
to disclose PHI for their own marketing activities and not for any other 
reason.49  This means that covered entities cannot give or sell any form of 
protected health information, including lists of patients, to third parties without 
obtaining consent from the individual.50 
 
 42. § 164.501. 
 43. A covered entity is not marketing when it describes the entities participating in a health 
care provider network or a health plan network or when it describes the services offered or the 
benefits covered by the health plan.  A covered entity is also not marketing when the 
communication is tailored to the circumstances of a particular individual as long as the 
communication is 1) “[m]ade by a health care provider to an individual as part of the treatment of 
the individual, and for the purpose of furthering the treatment of that individual”; or 2) “ [m]ade 
by a health care provider or health plan to an individual in the course of managing the treatment 
of that individual, or for the purpose of directing or recommending to that individual alternative 
treatments, therapies, health care providers, or settings of care.”  § 164.501. 
 44. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2001). 
 45. § 164.514(e). 
 46. Id. 
 47. § 164.514(e)(2)(ii). 
 48. HHS Fact Sheet, supra note 38. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
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This standard severely limits the information that can be obtained from 
health care organizations.  Prior to the promulgation of the Rule, absent any 
relevant state law, health care organizations could sell PHI to third parties for 
any use or disclose it to third parties who could then use the information for 
their own marketing purposes.51  Now, under the new rule, physicians can no 
longer provide patient lists or other PHI to pharmaceutical companies to be 
used for those companies’ product promotions unless all the appropriate 
individuals consent.52  Obtaining this consent is likely to be economically and 
logistically unfeasible. 
These restrictions on the identifiable medical information available to third 
parties are likely to directly impinge on DTC advertising.  Without pertinent 
data, companies cannot efficiently target specific individuals or groups of 
individuals for advice.  While personal information is available from other 
sources, such as Internet tracking and online profiling, the Privacy Rule 
provides some level of protection against unauthorized use of protected 
medical information. 
V.  PRODUCT LIABILITY AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 
Traditionally, patients go to physicians for their expertise and advice on 
treatment options.  Physicians, not patients, make the decisions as to what 
drugs to prescribe.  Today, as more patients obtain medical advice and 
information from pharmaceutical companies via the Internet, questions arise 
about who should be held liable for misinformation about prescription drugs: 
the physician or the pharmaceutical company itself. 
Back when the physician was the sole decision-maker, liability generally 
rested on the physician because he or she was deemed to be a “learned 
intermediary” between the pharmaceutical company and the patient.53  In part 
because pharmaceutical manufacturers lacked the means to educate patients 
directly, it was the physician’s responsibility to inform the patient of the risks 
of the drug, thus relieving the pharmaceutical company of liability.54  But as 
manufacturers advertise directly to consumers and bypass physicians, one may 
argue that these manufacturers should no longer be immune from liability.55  A 
pure disclaimer may no longer be sufficient; instead, the argument is that the 
manufacturer has a legal obligation to directly warn the patient about the 
potential risks and complications.  An exception to the “learned intermediary” 
doctrine, whereby manufacturers could no longer rely on physicians to disclose 
risks but would have to do so themselves, may require consideration. 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). 
 54. Id. at 1246. 
 55. Id. 
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First articulated in 1966, the “learned intermediary” rule holds that 
prescription drug manufacturers are exempt from the legal duty to warn the 
ultimate user about the risks of prescription drugs.56  Instead, the 
manufacturer’s duty to warn extends to the physician.57  The prescribing 
physician then acts as a “learned intermediary” between the patient and the 
manufacturer and warns the patient of the drug’s potential risks.58 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts adopts the “learned intermediary” 
doctrine.59  Section 6(d) sets forth the traditional rule of the learned 
intermediary: 
 A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate 
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding 
foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to: (1) prescribing and other health-
care providers who are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance 
with the instructions or warnings; or (2) the patient when the manufacturer 
knows or has reason to know that health-care providers will not be in a 
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or 
warnings.60 
The learned intermediary rule is an accepted doctrine; however, there are 
exceptions to the rule which recognize that direct warnings to patients are 
necessary for drugs dispensed without the personal intervention or evaluation 
of a health care provider.61  One example, discussed in comment (e) to Section 
6 of the Restatement, is mass inoculations.62  In mass vaccination programs, 
physicians are not in the position to evaluate individual patients and relate the 
potential risks of the drug to each patient.63  Courts have held manufacturers 
responsible for informing the patient directly of the risks associated with the 
drug where there is no health care provider serving as a learned intermediary 
between the manufacturer and the patient.64 
Whether an exception to the “learned intermediary” doctrine should be 
applied to DTC advertising is unclear in the courts.  When manufacturers 
advertise a prescription drug in the mass media, FDA regulations require that 
the advertisement be coupled with information that discloses the major side 
effects and contraindications of the drug.  The question is whether sufficient 
warnings to the health care provider insulate the manufacturer from tort 
 
 56. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1997). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. § 6(d) cmt. e. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968) (imposing a duty on 
the manufacturer to warn the patient in polio vaccine cases). 
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liability.65  Manufacturers contend that the “learned intermediary” rule should 
apply, arguing that despite DTC advertising, drugs cannot be prescribed unless 
a physician makes an individualized assessment of the patient.66  The physician 
still serves as a “learned intermediary,” thereby insulating manufacturers from 
liability.  Others argue for an exception to the “learned intermediary” rule 
under which manufacturers must warn patients directly.  Comment (e) to the 
Restatement states that “developing case law” should determine whether there 
should be an exception to the “learned intermediary” rule in these situations.67 
A New Jersey Supreme Court case, Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., is 
the only case thus far to recognize an exception to the “learned intermediary 
doctrine” when a manufacturer advertises directly to consumers.68  In Perez, 
Wyeth undertook a massive advertising campaign for Norplant that was 
directed at women instead of their doctors.69  The advertisements did not warn 
consumers of any potential risks posed by Norplant.70  The plaintiffs, who 
suffered from the side effects of Norplant, argued that an exception to the 
“learned intermediary doctrine” should be recognized because the 
manufacturer advertised directly to the consumer.71  The trial court held that 
the “learned intermediary doctrine” applied, and the New Jersey Appellate 
Division affirmed the trial court’s determination.72  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and held that the “learned 
intermediary doctrine” does not apply to the direct marketing of drugs to 
consumers.73  The court held that “[p]rescription drug manufacturers that 
market their products directly to consumers should be subject to claims by 
consumers if their advertising fails to provide an adequate warning of the 
product’s dangerous propensities.”74 
The Perez court argued that DTC advertising conflicts with the premises 
on which the “learned intermediary doctrine” is based and renders the 
traditional model obsolete.75  According to the court, those premises are “(1) 
reluctance to undermine the doctor-patient relationship; (2) absence in the era 
of ‘doctor knows best’ of need for the patient’s informed consent; (3) inability 
of drug manufacturers to communicate with patients; and (4) complexity of the 
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subject.”76  The court pointed out that all of these, with the possible exception 
of the last, are absent in the direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription 
drugs.77 
With respect to the first two premises, the court stated that the paternalistic 
“Norman Rockwell” image of the family doctor was, for the most part, 
obsolete.78  Informed consent requirements have transformed the model into a 
patient-based decision, as opposed to a solely physician-based model.79  With 
respect to the second premise, the court noted that due to current managed care 
restraints, “physicians have significantly less time to inform patients of the 
risks and benefits of the drug.”80  Finally, the court stated that given the large 
sums of money spent on advertising, drug manufacturers could not claim that 
they had ineffective means by which to communicate directly with patients.81  
Given all this, the court argued that DTC advertising runs counter to the 
premises upon which the “learned intermediary doctrine” is based.82 
The court contended that consumers today are active participants in their 
health care decisions and do not rely solely on physicians to decide whether a 
drug should be used.83  The court also stated that it did not make sense that 
requiring manufacturers to provide direct warnings to a consumer would 
undermine the patient-physician relationship because DTC advertising intruded 
on that relationship by encouraging consumers to ask their doctors for specific 
drugs.84  Finally, the court explained that DTC advertising rebuts the notion 
that the risks of prescription drugs are too complex to be communicated to 
consumers.85  The court further explained that because the FDA mandates 
warnings for prescription drugs, the consumer might presume that the 
manufacturer guarantees these warnings.86  Therefore, the court held, “the 
common law duty to war[n] the consumer should apply.”87 
As noted by the court, manufacturers have presumptively met their duty to 
warn physicians about risks of prescription drugs if they are in compliance 
with federal labeling standards.88  This presumption, however, is a rebuttable 
one.89  The court held that in the area of DTC advertising of pharmaceuticals, 
 
 76. Id. at 1255. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1255-56. 
 82. Id. at 1256. 
 83. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259. 
 89. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
170 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:157 
the same rebuttable presumption exists when a manufacturer has complied 
with FDA advertising, labeling and warning requirements.90  The rationale 
behind the ruling was that the approach 
harmonizes the manufacturer’s duty to doctors and to the public when it 
chooses to directly advertise its products, and simultaneously recognizes the 
public interest in informing patients about new pharmaceutical developments.  
Moreover, a rebuttable presumption that the duty to consumers is met by 
compliance with FDA regulations helps to ensure that manufacturers are not 
made guarantors against remotely possible, but not scientifically-verifiable, 
side-effects of prescription drugs, a result that could have a ‘significant anti-
utilitarian effect.’91 
The final issue in the Perez case involved proximate cause, that is, whether 
the misinformation supplied by Wyeth concerning Norplant was a substantial 
contributing factor to the harm suffered.92  If that is the case, the next question 
is whether the role of the physician breaks the chain of causation.93  The court 
noted that the arrival of DTC advertising has altered the role of the physician.94  
Traditionally, the physician has been the ultimate decision maker when 
choosing which prescription drug to prescribe for a patient.  While DTC 
advertising provides some health information to consumers, it is usually not 
comprehensive information, which may lead to patients having an incomplete 
or improper understanding of a drug.95  As the Perez court noted, patients often 
arrive at physicians’ offices with preconceived and incorrect notions of which 
drug treatment is appropriate.96  Physicians often feel pressured by their 
patients to prescribe a specific drug the patient has seen advertised, regardless 
of whether the drug best suits the individual patient.97  Given that most 
physicians cannot afford to lose patients, the court stated that many physicians 
might relent to this pressure.98 
The court maintained that this change in the nature of the physician’s role 
meant that the physician’s intervention did not necessarily break the chain of 
causation.99  The court held that “in the case of direct marketing of drugs, we 
believe that neither the physician nor the manufacturer should be entirely 
relieved of their respective duties to warn.  Pharmaceutical manufacturers may 
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seek contribution, indemnity or exoneration because of the physician’s 
deficient role in prescribing the drug.”100  To date, no other courts have 
followed the decision in Perez.  However, as DTC advertising becomes more 
prolific, Perez may foreshadow a transformation away from the traditional 
application of the “learned intermediary doctrine.”101 
VI.  ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER 
ADVERTISING 
Beyond any new legal liabilities surrounding DTC advertising, companies 
that engage in such activities have certain social responsibilities dictated by 
their roles as corporate citizens in a business which has profound impact on the 
health and well being of the public.  On one side, there are some who argue 
that by tracking individually identifiable health information and tailoring DTC 
advertising to patients, pharmaceutical companies have an incredible 
opportunity to provide the public with information about diseases and 
treatment alternatives, encouraging them to seek care and speak with 
physicians.  Some also contend that DTC advertising has the potential to 
decrease prescription prices by increasing competition between pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.102  This is especially critical considering our overall health care 
system accounts for nearly fifteen percent of our Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).103 
On the other side, some ask whether DTC advertising could serve two 
masters:  the promotional interest of the pharmaceutical industry and the public 
health’s needs.104  Companies are ultimately responsible to their shareholders, 
not patients, and shareholders’ desires for increased sales are often at odds with 
patients’ needs for rational drug prescribing.105  Others contend that it is 
difficult to believe that DTC advertising can lower the cost of health care when 
medications selected for advertisement are expensive ones with large profit 
margins.  In addition, these drugs often present few advantages over older 
drugs and have safety profiles that are less understood.106 
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In light of these conflicting views surrounding the impact of DTC 
advertising, the social obligations and ethical conduct of corporations such as 
pharmaceutical companies will be increasingly scrutinized.  Until recently, the 
traditional context for questions of ethics in health care involved a focus on 
individual choices.107  Today, however, we must conceive of ethical issues not 
only for individual persons, but also for systems and social structures.108  Much 
of this realization resulted from the emergence and proliferation of managed 
care organizations as a means of delivering health care in the United States.  
As decisions by patients and their physicians are no longer free of third party 
influences, the managed care industry’s initial lack of attention to the symbolic 
and instrumental importance of its role as a corporate citizen has spawned 
efforts to regulate its affairs and impose new legal liabilities on its actions.109 
In many ways, the managed care industry’s fate could befall the 
pharmaceutical industry if it does not constructively address the reality that its 
actions are viewed with increasing skepticism.  The escalating costs of life 
prolonging and saving medications are increasingly unaffordable for the most 
vulnerable among us.  Some contend that the pharmaceutical industry benefits 
from taxpayer funded biomedical research without paying for these benefits.  
This “free rider” problem is especially difficult for some consumer advocates 
to accept given that the pharmaceutical industry has historically been one of 
the most profitable sectors of the economy. 
However, recent efforts of pharmaceutical companies to address the AIDS 
epidemic in Africa suggest that they realize their larger responsibilities to not 
only their shareholders, but also to the larger community.110  As opposed to the 
tobacco industry, pharmaceutical companies produce and market products that 
rational individuals want and desire.  Therefore, it is in the self-interest of 
pharmaceutical companies to behave in a way that contributes to the 
establishment of a social and legal marketplace that permits them to make a 
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reasonable return on their investment, while satisfying their role as corporate 
citizens.  Ultimately, it is not only the right thing to do, but it is the smart thing 
to act with institutional integrity and conscience. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The emergence of DTC advertising on the Internet has the potential to 
provide patients with information that will empower them to make more 
informed decisions about their health and health care.  While the prospect of a 
more informed patient is a worthy objective, these developments also raise 
ethical concerns about privacy, new potential product liabilities for third 
parties and considerations about the social responsibilities of corporations 
whose business has a profound impact on the health and well being of the 
public.  Therefore, greater attention needs to be paid to the implications of 
DTC advertising via the Internet as increasingly more human activity and 
endeavors, including those in medicine, are lived on the World Wide Web. 
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